World War IV: Islamism vs. the U.S.

With September 11th, 2001 it was made clear to anyone and everyone in the field of security and beyond that the relative quiet period of the post-Cold War 90's had lulled many into thinking if any new threat were to arise it would look and feel very much like the geopolitically-continental shift that had taken place post-World War II. As exampled in Thomas PM Barnett's book, "The Pentagon's New Map", much of the Brass and civilian insiders were hedging bets on which country would fill the bipolar void left by the Soviet Union: China, India, Pakistan, and—ironically enough—the sputtering democracy that was Russia; all and others were debated. But, instead, it was not a country-empire of the likes of Rome or the Soviet Union, with borders, socio-political norms, and an internally working system of government; it was a country resembling those in Robert D Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy"—with porous borders, socio-political instability, and lacking a government able to control much beyond the capital. Though the nexus of a failed state (i.e., Afghanistan) and an opportunistic network of ideological brethren were able to wreak havoc on a country thousands of miles away, many inside & outside Washington believe the world does not live with the existential threat of nuclear annihilation several times over as it did during the Cold War. Yet, once again the whole world is a staging for war. With the Soviets there was at least a sense of self-preservation in their policies. There is none of this sense with the Islamic radicals. They welcome death. This is the prospect that makes this enemy worse than any seen before.

At its end, it has been approximated that had the US and the USSR begun a nuclear exchange the world would have been obliterated at least 10 times over. That it has the sound of hyperbole tells the story of the era. While history can make the conclusion that such a nuclear exchange never took place, it leaves out many of the finer details: one such detail being the Cuban Missile Crisis. "Crisis" is not an overstatement in this case. One, because of the uncomfortably close proximity of Soviet warheads to the US (just 90 miles away from the coast of Florida); two, the culture of distrust and ideological differences made for nearly incoherent discourse between the US and USSR; and three, hardliners in both Washington and Moscow were quite willing to shoot first and ask questions later. Robert McNamara, in the recent film "Fog of War", made the reality of the situation stark in showing war was averted only by the slimmest of margins.

While the Cuban Missile Crisis may have weakened stomachs to the idea of a direct war between two nuclear powers, it left much room open for proxy wars. Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan—all were staging grounds for the ideological struggle between communist-Sino-Asia and the democratic-West. Though the casualties of these indirect conflicts were not wiped out in atomic instant, they nonetheless numbered in the hundreds of thousands. The empirical fact of many socialist groups using words such as "wave" or "tide" showed "conquering" need no longer be about having military size and strength or occupying land of another country; rather, one need only ideological kinship to win. Perhaps in no better place was this shown than in Vietnam, where the US military never lost a major engagement but lost the "hearts and minds" of not only the native population but the American people as well. Such was the fear of countries falling to these "waves" that wars in far off places were even contemplated. In many ways the Cold War was a "Hot" war because this line of thinking made the world a staging area for the ideological struggle between democracy and socialism. In this sense it was World War III.

All this said, it is the void left by the Soviet Union which has made the present possible. Whereas the Cold War gave rise to geopolitical concerns as "buffer zones" and "client states", in which either the US or the USSR would form alliances to assure against the further spread of the other, these alliances became of lesser importance once the "20^th Century Great Game" was over (interestingly, the 19^th Century version of the "Game" was waged by then Czarist Russia against the English-speaking hegemony of that era— Great Britain—for all the marbles in Central Asia). Many of these border countries were unstable and/or ruled by oppressive dictators to begin with. Thus, when the Game was over, much of the support went away.

What has been left behind are many countries in name only, for the cycle of violence has left little internal government control; leaving a vacuum which sucks in scores of alliances unconcerned with the good of the native populace. Failed states have always been a danger. For, the cycle of violence could extend and destabilize surrounding countries. The element missing before, which makes them even more dangerous now, is the existence of al Qaeda. Afghanistan is not the sole example of this. This vacuum exists in West and East Africa (as a recent military raid into the failed state of Somalia showed: where a sizable al Qaeda network was disrupted—many of its elements killed). It also exists in Latin America, in the Tri-Border region. So named for where Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil meet at their corners. It would seem that Islamic Fundamentalists have little in common with Marxist revolutionary groups, but this is indeed not the case in that region.

This vacuum has also been demonstrated by the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq. Debated, it was before the war whether or not al Qaeda's presence in the country was pronounced enough to invade. Only a few months after Saddam's fall this was no longer an issue. al Qaeda leaders made it explicitly clear they saw/see Iraq as one of their frontlines of the war against the West. Iraq has made another reality present itself: every Muslim held or Muslim state (where the net majority of the population identifies itelf as Muslim)—be it Syria, Egypt, Iran, or Indonesia—has a potential to become a vacuum for such a network of like-minded people as al Qaeda were that country's government to fall. Hence: firstly, any failed state already predominately Muslim as susceptible to becoming a training ground for and/or controlled by Islamic radicals; secondly, that these groups have explicitly stated their desire for martyrdom by any means—biologic, chemical, and/or nuclear—the whole world is once again a staging for war. With the Soviets there was at least a sense of self-preservation in their policies. There is none of this sense with the Islamic radicals. They welcome death. This is the prospect that makes this enemy worse than any seen before in the US's history.